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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BRANDON WILLIAM HENNIG,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48502-2020
Kootenai County Case No.
CR28-19-11962

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Hennig failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced
him to twenty-five years with ten years fixed for aggravated battery, with a deadly weapon
enhancement?
ARGUMENT
Hennig Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Law enforcement responded to a report of a man with blood on him yelling for help. (R.,

p.25.) An officer made contact with Joseph Coby at his residence. (R., p.25.) Coby was sitting
in a patio chair with a large amount of blood on himself and his clothing. (R., p.25.) Officers
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observed that Coby seemed scared and in shock, with blood covering his head and neck from what
appeared to be a serious head laceration. (R., p.25.) Coby’s hands were covered in blood and his
pinky finger appeared broken and severely split open. (R., p.25.) He appeared to have at least one
missing or broken tooth. (R., p.25.) Coby made repeated statements about dying. (R., p.25.)
Coby told law enforcement that he had come home from work in the evening; when he
entered his home, he saw a man in a mask he later identified as his friend Hennig. (R., pp.25, 174,
305.) Hennig immediately attacked Coby with a baseball bat, striking him several times in the
head and upper body. (R., p.25.) Hennig then placed Coby in a chokehold and said “[s]hhhh stop”
as he applied pressure to Coby’s neck. (R., p.25.) Coby resisted, biting one of Hennig’s fingers.
(R., p.25.) After Coby got away, Hennig fled. (R., p.25.) Coby reported that he had no idea why
Hennig attacked him. (R., p.25.)
At the scene, officers observed blood on the concrete stairs leading down to the residence,
blood smeared on the railing, blood on the inside door jam, and blood on the walls on either side
of the entrance. (R., pp.29, 125.) They observed two bloody handprints and blood on the toe of
Coby’s right shoe. (R., p.29.) The officers located a baseball bat with blood smeared on the end
and a black mask with two eye holes cut out. (R., p.29.)
After multiple attempts, officers were able to make contact with Hennig at his
grandparent’s residence. (R., pp.26, 34.) Officers noted Hennig appeared to have injuries
consistent with being involved in a fight. (R., pp.34-35.) In Hennig’s vehicle, officers observed
what appeared to be blood on the steering wheel and on the cloth armrest, with apparent efforts
made to clean the blood off the armrest, two rolls of paper towels, some type of cleaner in a spray
bottle. (R., p.35; Conf. Ex., pp.110-22.) Officers also saw a black sweatshirt, binoculars, a
headlamp, a flashlight, and an opened box of latex gloves. (R., p.35; Conf. Ex., pp.128-36.)
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During a search of Hennig’s residence and vehicle, officers also located garbage bags, a stun gun,
cleaning supplies, gloves, duct tape, hammers, knives, a bat, a flashlight, binoculars, pepper spray,
a padlock, lock picks, mutilated dolls, drawings, a training dummy, a fictional book about a serial
killer, masks, and a bone saw. (R., p.176; see Conf. Ex., pp.144-284.)
The state charged Hennig by indictment with attempted first degree murder, aggravated
battery, and burglary, with a deadly weapon enhancement. (R., pp.43-44, 97-98.) Pursuant to a
plea agreement, Hennig pleaded guilty to aggravated battery with a deadly weapon enhancement
and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., p.255; 9/29/2020 Tr., p.9, L.18 – p.10, L.14.)
The district court sentenced Hennig to twenty-five years with ten years fixed. (R., pp.321-24.)
Hennig filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.326-28.)
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In evaluating
whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which
asks “whether the court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v.
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).
3

C.

Hennig Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but presumes that the determinate portion will be the period
of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing
Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). “When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence,
this Court conducts an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. McIntosh,
160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015). To establish that the sentence was excessive, the
appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate
to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. “‘In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not
substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.’” State v.
Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2018) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho
139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).
The sentence is reasonable in light of the conduct underlying the crime. Coby came home
from work in the evening, only to be brutally attacked by a man he considered a friend. (R., p.25.)
Hennig, who had been lying in wait wearing a mask, beat Coby in the head and upper body with
a baseball bat. (R., pp.25, 305.) Coby tried to flee but Hennig caught him and placed him in a
chokehold; Hennig continued to choke Coby, telling him to stop resisting, until Coby was able to
bite Hennig’s finger and break free. (R., pp.25, 305-306.) When Coby made his way to his
neighbor’s for help, Hennig fled. (R., pp.25, 306.) As a result of Hennig’s attack, Coby suffered
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serious injuries, including significant damage to his jaw, teeth, and pinky finger, and accrued tens
of thousands of dollars in medical expenses from multiple procedures. (R., pp.25, 265-302, 30607.) There was no apparent motive for the attack. (R., p.25.)
Hennig asserts that the attack was an unfortunate result of his undiagnosed post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). (Appellant’s brief, pp.2-3, 8-9.) While there is no dispute that Hennig
suffers from PTSD, as the prosecutor pointed out below, that explanation simply does not fit the
facts of this case. (See 12/10/2020 Tr., p.39, Ls.18-22.) Hennig claims he carried a baseball bat
with him for protection from cougars and he had the mask with him because wearing a mask is a
sexual fetish he enjoys. (See Conf. Doc., pp.135, 455.) Those explanations do not make sense in
the context of what occurred; there was no basis to carry protection from cougars for the short
walk up to the entrance of Coby’s residence, nor does it make sense that Hennig would be carrying
a sexual fetish mask, given that he was allegedly going to Coby’s house to print his resume and
not intending to have a sexual encounter with Coby. Hennig asserts that he was waiting outside
Coby’s door, Coby pushed past him, and then when Coby pulled out his keys, Hennig thought it
was a knife and went into self-defense mode. (Conf. Doc., p.135; Appellant’s brief, pp.2-3.) That
is contradicted by Coby’s account—that he did not see Hennig as he approached his door, that he
opened it and got one foot inside before he was attacked. (See R., pp.25, 305.) Moreover,
Hennig’s PTSD explanation for seeing the keys as a knife and using the bat in self-defense does
not explain why Hennig pursued and attempted to choke Coby after beating him. As the district
court noted, “[t]here are a lot of people in this society who have suffered trauma” but “[t]hey don’t,
as a general rule, go around beating people with baseball bats.” (12/10/2020 Tr., p.61, Ls.5-10.)
The items in Hennig’s vehicle and room, as well as those found in a tote, also call into
question his version of events and suggest a much more sinister intent. In Hennig’s vehicle,
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officers observed blood with evidence that Hennig had attempted to clean it up and they located
cleaning supplies, a flashlight, a headlamp, binoculars, duct tape, an opened box of latex gloves,
knives, and a stun gun; in Hennig’s room, officers located more weapons, a hammer, knives, a bat,
pepper spray, lock picks, a training dummy, mutilated dolls, masks, and a bone saw. (R., pp.35,
176; -see Conf. Ex., pp.128-284.) Further, officers found a tote connected to Hennig in a secluded
wilderness area on someone’s property. (Conf. Doc., p.258.) Inside, officers found a backpack,
numerous knives (both in a set and loose), zip ties, plastic wrap, duct tape, a face shield, a staple
gun, a roll of black garbage bags, clear plastic, cloth, and cleaning supplies. (Conf. Doc., p.258.)
The district court considered the objectives of criminal sentencing and the information
prepared for and presented at sentencing, including testimony given on Hennig’s behalf.
(12/20/2020 Tr., p.57, L.18 – p.58, L.7.) The district court specifically recognized the mitigating
factors in Hennig’s case, such as his substance abuse issues, past trauma, his mental health, his
lack of prior criminal behavior, and his remorse. (12/10/2020 Tr., p.59, L.10 – p.60, L.3.)
However, as the PSI noted, Hennig’s crime “involved significant violence” and “caused serious
physical injury, permanent physical injury, unknown future medical treatment, and emotional
trauma.” (Conf. Doc., p.146.) “After considering all of the information that has been presented,
considering all of the mitigating factors that have been brought up quite completely by the defense,
in order to deter [Hennig] and others, in order to protect society and in order to give Mr. Hennig
an opportunity to try and continue his rehabilitation without causing any risk to society, a prison
sentence is appropriate in this case.” (12/10/2020 Tr., p.61, Ls.11-18.) The district court
reasonably followed the PSI’s recommendation of incarceration and concluded a sentence of
twenty-five years with ten years fixed “does address the goals of sentencing” and “recognizes the
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mitigating factors that Mr. Hennig has, yet still holds him accountable and will protect society.”
(12/10/2020 Tr., p.61, L.25 – p.62, L.3; Conf. Doc., pp.146-47.)
Hennig argues that the district court abused its discretion and its decision runs contrary to
the applicable legal standards because the court’s decision “fails to promote rehabilitation as the
first means to achieve the protection of society” and fails to take into consideration his numerous
mitigating circumstances. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-12.) As discussed above, the district court
specifically recognized and considered Hennig’s many mitigating circumstances. (See 12/10/2020
Tr., p.59, L.10 – p.60, L.3.) However, the district court also considered the severity of Hennig’s
crime, the brutal beating he inflicted upon Coby, and the risk that his actions pose to society.
(12/10/2020 Tr., p.60, L.4 – p.61, L.10.) The district court specifically considered rehabilitation,
as well as Hennig’s request that the court retain jurisdiction, and concluded that a period of
incarceration would act as a deterrent and afford Hennig the opportunity to seek treatment and be
rehabilitated in a secure setting, while also providing protection for the community. (12/10/2020
Tr., p.58, L.13 – p.59, L.5; p.61, L.11 – p.62, L.6.) Hennig has failed to show that the district court
abused its sentencing discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 19th day of July, 2021.

/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of July, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

KLJ/dd

/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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